I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, a key trend in the world economy has been the growth in crossborder asset trade. Driven by a combination of capital account and trade liberalization, declining transaction costs, and a general improvement in the level of financial sophistication, investors have steadily increased the weight allocated to foreign assets in their portfolios. The growth in international financial trade, illustrated in Figure 1 , has accelerated dramatically since the mid-1990s-for several financially open countries, total holdings of external assets and liabilities are now larger than GDP. Do these financial globalization trends matter for the real economy? What is the link between external imbalances and real exchange rates? Should we concentrate our attention on a country's net external position as an indicator of external exposure, or do gross external assets and liabilities (and their composition) convey additional useful information on an economy's links with the rest of the world? The goal of this article is to illustrate the answers to these questions provided in the literature, and in particular to work out the implications of financial globalization for exchange rate behavior.
To preview our findings, we argue that financial globalization has important implications for exchange rate behavior, and for the adjustment of economies to external shocks. Countries with a positive stock of net foreign assets tend to have more appreciated real exchange rates, and countries with large external liabilities tend to have more depreciated exchange rates. We also highlight the importance of gross external holdings. For advanced economies, with liabilities primarily issued in domestic currency and assets denominated in foreign currency, an exchange rate depreciation tends to improve the country's net external position by increasing the size of external assets relative to external liabilities-a reflection of the scope for more efficient risk-sharing provided by international portfolio diversification. Along similar lines, we emphasize the increasingly important role played by differences in rates of return on external assets and liabilities in shaping the dynamics of a country's external imbalances.
We divide the analysis into two parts. In Section II, we first consider how financial globalization may affect trends in the long-run value of exchange rates. Subsequently, we turn in Section III to how financial globalization has increased the importance of the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment. Finally, Section IV offers some concluding remarks.
II. FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION, NET EXTERNAL POSITIONS AND EXCHANGE RATES IN THE LONG RUN
By definition, the current account balance (and hence the net external position) must be zero for a financially-autarkic country. International financial integration allows a country to run current account imbalances: if these are persistent, it may accumulate significant net external assets or liabilities. In addition, international financial integration allows a country's residents to diversify their portfolios-even with balanced trade and no need for net external financing, a country's residents can purchase foreign assets-for example, in the form of direct investment-while foreign residents purchase domestic financial instruments.
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For most of the Bretton Woods period (and also in the period of financial integration at the end of the last century-see Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004) capital flows primarily reflected the financing of external imbalances, rather than international diversification, and took primarily the form of cross-border loans, as well as some foreign direct investment. In other words, the difference between gross and net capital flows was modest. In recent years instead, gross capital flows have increased much more rapidly than net flows, as countries have become financially more integrated. In particular, cross-border flows of portfolio equity and foreign direct investment have increased significantly, both among industrial countries and between industrial countries and emerging markets.
While gross external positions have therefore rapidly increased, net external positions have also become larger-indeed, Figure 2 shows a sharp increase in the dispersion of net foreign asset positions, particularly since the mid-1990s. We now look more closely at the main countries underlying this trend. Figure 3 shows the current account balances (scaled by world GDP) for major countries and regions for the period 1994-2004, highlighting the substantial deterioration in the U.S. current account balance starting around 1997 and the improvement 1 In balance of payments statistics, external assets and liabilities are classified in several categories: foreign direct investment (direct ownership or control of a firm), portfolio equity investment ("small" equity participations), portfolio debt investment (debt and money-market securities) and other investment (including loans, trade credits, and other nonsecuritized debt categories). Foreign exchange reserves (central bank holdings of foreign currencies and bonds are classified separately. What is the link between net external positions and exchange rates? As is extensively discussed by Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) , a country that is a long-run net creditor or debtor faces a concomitant 'transfer problem'. 4 Under standard regularity conditions, a long-run creditor will on average run trade deficits (financed by positive net returns on its net external position) and, conversely, a long-run debtor will run trade surpluses. In general, this requires the real exchange rates of creditors to undergo trend appreciation vis-à-vis debtors.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) interesting finding is that a significant part of the comovement between net foreign assets and CPI-based real exchange rates is accounted for by a comovement between net foreign assets and the relative price of traded to nontraded goods at home (relative to the ratio of traded to nontraded goods' prices abroad), rather than through the relative price of traded goods across countries.
In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) we focus on the connection between the trade balance and the real exchange rate for a smaller set of high-income countries and confirm that long-run trade surpluses are associated with real depreciation and trade deficits with real appreciation.
Moreover, the paper provides direct evidence that the trade balance influences the long-run relative price of nontradables. In a calibrated demand-based model, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004, 2005) also highlight a quantitatively important relation between the trade balance and the relative price of nontradables, arguing that a reduction of the large U.S. current account deficit will have to entail a significant equilibrium reduction in the relative price of nontraded goods in the U.S. (relative to the rest of the world), and hence a large real depreciation.
However, it is important to note that the long-run link between the net international investment position and the trade balance can vary over time and across countries, for a number of reasons. First, for given returns on external assets and liabilities faster-growing debtor countries can stabilize their net external position with a smaller trade surplus than slow-growing countries. Second, the rates of return earned on foreign assets and paid out on foreign liabilities can (and do) differ across countries-they depend on the composition of the international balance sheet (e.g. the split between debt and equity instruments) and the investment skills of national investors.
For instance, the United States has managed to maintain a positive net investment income balance despite being a debtor nation since 1986: more generally, taking into account capital gains, it enjoys a positive differential between the return it earns on its foreign asset holdings relative to the return international investors obtain on its foreign liabilities, as clearly shown in Figure 5 . 5 This dilutes the exchange rate impact of running persistent current account deficits for two reasons. First, for a given sequence of current account deficits, the net foreign liability position grows more slowly if the return on foreign assets exceeds the return on foreign liabilities. Second, the scale of the long-run trade surplus that a debtor nation must run is also smaller, the higher is the return on foreign assets and the lower the return on foreign liabilities.
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Have exchange rates in recent years moved in line with the predictions of a long-run link between net foreign assets and real exchange rates? Figure 8 shows that over the past 2 ½ years the U.S. dollar has depreciated in real effective terms, as the increasing stock of U.S.
external liabilities would lead to predict. However, if one takes a slightly longer perspective it becomes apparent that the link between net foreign assets and real exchange rates in the data has weakened. Figure 9 shows that the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate between 1998 and 2003 is negatively correlated with the change in net foreign assets in industrial countries.
A more rigorous analysis (see Milesi-Ferretti, Ricci, and Lee, 2005) shows that for the industrial countries' group the link between net foreign assets and real exchange rates has weakened even after controlling for the behavior of other economic fundamentals, such as productivity differentials and the terms of trade. While valuation effects (which are becoming more important with the increase in international financial integration, as discussed below)
have clearly have played a role. One possible conjecture is that the increased scope for international financial integration allows countries to run larger net debtor and creditor positions. During the transition to this new steady state, countries with growing external liabilities (assets) may well run trade deficits (surpluses) and have appreciated (depreciated) exchange rates. Therefore the long-run link between net foreign assets and real exchange rates captured in the regressions may be weakened by these (protracted) transitional dynamics, but would be re-established over time. Be that as it may, this is an area for futue research.
III. SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS: THE VALUATION CHANNEL
In the previous section, we highlighted the long-run sensitivity of the exchange rate to the net external position. However, shifts in exchange rates directly influence the dynamics of the external position through two mechanisms. First, for conventional reasons, exchange rate depreciation is expected to improve the trade balance over some interval. Second, unexpected exchange rate changes also shift the external position through a "valuation channel" to the extent that the asset and liability sides of the international balance sheet are asymmetrically affected by currency movements.
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For advanced economies, the valuation channel tends to operate in the same direction as the traditional trade-balance channel. Since, for these countries, liabilities to foreign investors are mostly tied to the domestic currency and foreign assets are more heavily weighted towards foreign-currency instruments, a depreciation raises the value of foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities, improving the net foreign asset position. Figure 6 shows the close connection for the U.S. between exchange rate movements and net capital gains on its external portfolio, and Figure 7 shows that the same correlation holds for Japan.
Most recently, the U. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the importance of such valuation effects is directly increasing in the scale of cross-border asset holdings. 9 For simplicity, let us suppose that a country's foreign assets are entirely denominated in foreign currency and all of its foreign liabilities are in domestic currency. If foreign assets and liabilities are both equal to 20 percent of GDP (the scale of external assets and liabilities in the United States at end-1980), an unexpected 10 percent devaluation generates a capital gain equal to 2 percent of GDP; if both sides of the balance sheet are scaled up to 100 percent of GDP (the scale of U.S.
8 Much debate has centered on the role of emerging Asia (and China in particular) in global imbalances. While emerging Asia has increased in prominence in trade and in the financing of the US deficit, Europe and Japan remain the dominant financial counter-party to the US in terms of the accumulated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. 9 See also Tille (2003) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) . Second, investors would come to factor in anticipated depreciations into required interest rates, thus offsetting the valuation channel. For these reasons, excessive current account deficits cannot indefinitely persist: trade balance adjustment must eventually take place.
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In contrast to the situation for the industrial countries, the valuation channel may work in the opposite direction for emerging-market economies: with liabilities to foreigners issued in foreign currencies, devaluation exerts a negative balance-sheet effect. As was dramatically 10 That said, the valuation gain from exchange rate depreciation may boost domestic expenditure through the associated positive wealth effect, such the trade balance deteriorates and the improvement is the net external position is correspondingly less than proportional. See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) . 11 See also Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) .
highlighted by the various currency crises during 1994-2001, the net result is that adjustment dynamics for these countries are greatly amplified: a sudden stop in capital inflows entails a magnified initial devaluation, on account of the negative wealth effect associated with the deterioration in the external balance sheet.
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The increase in portfolio equity and foreign direct investment flows to emerging markets has gone some way towards reducing the currency exposure of their net external position, since portfolio equity and FDI liabilities are denominated in domestic currency. An improvement in the attractiveness of local-currency debt issues to foreign investors would significantly reduce the riskiness of the external debt profile of this group of countries.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Financial globalization is stimulating researchers to take a fresh look at exchange rate economics. At one level, it has re-awakened interest in a classic question in international economics -the transfer problem. At another, it has focused attention on the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment: given the large (and increasing) stocks of external assets and liabilities denominated in different currencies, exchange rate changes imply not only expenditure-switching, but also significant capital gains and losses that influence the dynamics of the external position.
Looking forward, the unprecedented scale of the current United States imbalance provides an extremely interesting case study. Will adjustment be gradual or sharp? How will the dollar behave over the short-and long-term? By how much will the valuation effect ease the pressure on the trade balance? How will the rest of the world adjust to a decline in net import demand from the United States and currency appreciation vis-à-vis the dollar? These questions form an exciting research agenda for international macroeconomists. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Equity FDI Debt
Note: Chart plots the sum of aggregate equity, FDI, and debt assets and liabilities as a share of aggregate GDP for a sample of industrial countries including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. The sample choice is dictated by data availability.
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) . 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 NFA to world GDP NFA to GDP Note: the dashed line plots the standard deviation in the ratio of net foreign assets to world GDP and the solid line the standard deviation in the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic GDP for a large set of industrial countries and emerging markets. The sample for the ratio of NFA to domestic GDP excludes extreme outliers such as small financial centers, with net financial positions equal to multiples of GDP. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005b) . 
